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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we assess the evolution of labor-market performance in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) over the last decade. We provide 
a survey of the literature dealing with labor-market performance in the OECD, finding 
that, while this literature tends to conclude that institutions are a key part of the story, 
the survey’s results appear far less robust and uniform than is commonly believed. We 
then assess the robustness of the claims made in the most recent (2005) OECD follow-
up study within a very similar cross-country setup, and highlight the impact of 
unobserved heterogeneity and outliers on the policy estimates. We find that in recent 
OECD cross-country data, changes in labor-market performance are consistently (and 
inversely) linked to its lagged level. Structural changes are also important: changes in 
the share of construction employees are very significant, even in the presence of various 
kinds of policy change indicators. As far as the latter are concerned, some consistent role 
seems to emerge only for active labor-market policies and (to a lesser extent) 
unemployment benefit reforms. 
 
Keywords: Cross-Country Labor-market Comparisons; Labor-market Institutions; 
Product-market Institutions 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the 1980s, the labor market performance of most European countries showed 
clear signs of worsening vis-à-vis the United States. This situation was all the more 
surprising as it went against the experience of the previous two decades, when the U.S. 
employment rate was consistently lower than that of most European countries (see table 
1).  
 
Table 1. Labor Market Performance in the United States and Selected European 
Countries: 1964–2004 
 
(a) Employment Rates 
  1964 1974 1984 1994 2004 
Austria  0.67 0.64 0.64 0.70 0.68 
Belgium  0.58 0.59 0.52 0.54 0.58 
Denmark  0.70 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.75 
Finland  0.73 0.70 0.72 0.60 0.68 
France  0.65 0.64 0.59 0.58 0.63 
Germany  0.68 0.66 0.60 0.67 0.69 
Italy  0.58 0.55 0.54 0.51 0.57 
Netherlands  0.67 0.64 0.54 0.66 0.74 
Norway  0.65 0.66 0.73 0.72 0.76 
Portugal  0.65 0.68 0.64 0.65 0.71 
Spain  0.57 0.58 0.45 0.46 0.61 
Sweden  0.72 0.75 0.79 0.70 0.72 
Continental Europe 
(unweighted average)  0.65 0.65 0.62 0.63 0.68 
United  Kingdom  0.69 0.69 0.64 0.67 0.71 
United  States  0.60 0.64 0.67 0.71 0.71 
 
(b) Unemployment Rates 
  1964 1974 1984 1994 2004 
Austria  2.1  1.4    2.9    3.8    4.8 
Belgium  1.4  2.3  10.8    9.8    7.9 
Denmark  1.2  2.8    7.9    7.7    5.4 
Finland  1.7  1.9    5.2  16.6    8.8 
France  1.2  2.8    9.2  11.7    9.6 
Germany  0.5  1.8     7.1 8.3     9.5 
Italy  4.0  5.0    7.9  10.6    8.0 
Netherlands  0.5  2.9    8.9    6.8    4.6 
Norway  1.9  1.5    3.2    5.4    4.4 
Portugal  2.5  1.7    8.9    6.9    6.7 
Spain  1.3  0.6  16.5 19.8 11.0 
Sweden  1.6  2    3.3    9.4    6.3 
Continental Europe 
(unweighted average)  1.7  2.2    7.7    9.7    7.3 
United Kingdom  1.4  2.0  10.9    9.3    4.7 
United States  5.2  5.6    7.5    6.1    5.5 
Source: AMECO database 
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As is also apparent from table 1, in more recent years some European countries 
have managed to improve their labor market performance substantially, while others 
apear to be still trapped at low employment rates. These diverging labor market trends 
captured the attention of citizens and analysts from several countries. Attention in 
Europe was drawn to strong unions, restrictive employment protection legislation, 
generous social-safety nets, and large tax wedges. Indeed, labor market rigidities are 
widely held to play a key role in the bad European unemployment performance of the 
1980s and 1990s. This was the central message of the OECD’s Job Study (1994). More 
recent follow-up reports (Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta 1998; OECD 1999; Brandt, 
Burniaux, and Duval 2005) on the implementation of the Job Study’s recommendations 
reiterate this view. They also provide evidence, mostly based on bivariate relationships 
between some policy reform indicators and unemployment/employment rates, 
suggesting a direct link between structural reform and labor market outcomes. Such 
empirical support is less clear-cut in leading academic papers, mostly based on 
multivariate analyses that have become increasingly complex since the pioneering work 
of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991).
1  
In this paper we evaluate the OECD view through a different approach. Instead 
of relying on complex multivariate models, where possible misspecifications are hard to 
detect, we assess the robustness of the claims made in the most recent OECD follow-up 
study (Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval 2005) within a very similar cross-country set up and 
highlight the impact of unobserved heterogeneity and outliers on the policy estimates. In 
section 2 we provide a brief account of the relationships between labor market policies 
and outcomes, as seen from the perspective of the very influential Job Study (OECD 
1994). Section 3 considers some of the factors most often mentioned in the literature as 
contributing to poor labor market performance in Europe: generous social-safety nets, 
high taxes, strong unions, and restrictive employment legislation. While the literature 
tends to conclude that labor market institutions are a key part of the story, their role 
appears far less robust and uniform than is commonly believed. This brings us to section 
4, where we examine structural and institutional differences also outside the labor 
markets, such as industrial structure, financial markets, and the housing sector. We then 
undertake to provide some empirical evidence of a relatively novel kind upon these 
issues. In section 5, we set up an empirical framework calibrated on the most recent 
                                                            
1 See, for instance, the accounts in Nickell (2003), Saint-Paul (2004), and Freeman (2005). Some years 
previously, Blank (1997) had already expressed doubts on the capability of purely market-oriented 
reforms to generate a well-functioning labor market.   4
OECD follow-up study (Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval 2005), and suggest some ways in 
which the impact of unobserved heterogeneity and outliers on policy estimates can be 
detected and modeled in a simple cross-section framework. In section 6 we bring this 
framework to the data, considering 21 long-standing member countries of the OECD 
over a relatively recent period (1994–2004). Some concluding remarks close the paper 
(section 7). 
 
2.  LABOR MARKET POLICIES AND OUTCOMES—THE OECD JOBS 
STRATEGY 
 
In the 1980s, the labor market performance of most European countries showed clear 
signs of worsening vis-à-vis the United States, capturing the attention of citizens and 
policy makers in several European countries. By and large, the rise in unemployment 
appeared to be related to long-run structural factors rather than the outcome of purely 
cyclical forces. In 1994, the OECD published a very influential paper: the Jobs Study. 
The main thesis of the Jobs Study was that high unemployment in Europe originated 
from the existence of rigidities in the labor market. In their turn, these rigidities stemmed 
from the more pervasive public intervention in the labor market (meaning a generous 
welfare state and a highly redistributive tax policy) and the greater strength of unions, 
which characterized the European economies. 
The Jobs Study gave some explicit guidelines for institutional reform that were 
upheld in subsequent studies [see, for instance, OECD (1999)]. It carefully singled out 
for modification the institutions, regulations, and policies that were thought to be most 
responsible for the slow adjustment of the labor market to external shocks. Five 
guidelines were related to factors not strictly within the province of the labor market: 
enacting growth-oriented, noninflationary macroeconomic policies; enhancing the 
creation and diffusion of technological know-how; eliminating impediments to the 
creation of enterprises; promoting product market competition; and improving education 
and training systems. However, these macroeconomic and structural policies were 
believed to play a secondary role in fruitful institutional change. There was then a 
guideline endorsing active labor market policies and four guidelines calling for labor 
market deregulation: more flexibility of working time (both short-term and lifetime); 
more adaptation of wages to local and individual productivity; less employment security 
provisions inhibiting the expansion of employment; and a welfare system (including the   5
tax system) more attuned to labor market efficiency. The U.S. economy was explicitly 
taken as a benchmark. 
The OECD jobs strategy has been very influential and its basic tenets have been 
echoed by some important international organizations, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF 2003: ch. 4). Other international organizations have endorsed—
less enthusiastically—this strategy, especially in recent years (ILO 1996). 
Simultaneously with the publication of the OECD Jobs Study, the EU produced a similar 
document, the White Book, under the influence of the President of the European 
Commission, Jacques Delors. In that document, the unsatisfactory performance of 
European labor markets was linked to a set of structural factors not wholly congruent 
with those singled out in the OECD Jobs Study. The White Book laid more emphasis on 
the need to change an industrial structure that was biased in favor of declining sectors 
and to sustain job creation through appropriate industrial and growth-oriented 
macroeconomic policies. In subsequent years, however, the process of creating a single 
currency centered around the implementation of the so-called stability clauses drastically 
reduced the autonomy of member countries in the field of fiscal policy. Moreover, a 
single currency prevented the use of purely national monetary policies. An environment 
thus originated where idiosyncratic, adverse shocks could not be countered by domestic 
demand-management policies. It was then believed that only by enhancing labor market 
flexibility could one hope to offset the impact of such shocks on employment (Allsopp 
and Vines 1998; Artis 1998). This view has then been echoed in the European 
Employment Strategy, launched by the European Union at the Luxembourg Jobs 
Summit in 1997 and broadly maintained ever since. 
After almost fifteen years, what can be said about the OECD jobs strategy? How 
do European labor markets compare to their situation in the early 1990s and to the 
United States? As already said in the introduction, the OECD has published some 
follow-up reports and, more generally, much has been written about the trends illustrated 
in table 1. Broadly speaking, a consensus has emerged to the effect that that there is 
currently no such thing as a European unemployment problem. Much of the 
unemployment problem in the EU is concentrated in four large countries: France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain. Furthermore, it must be recognized that there has been a 
significant reduction in unemployment in Spain (and, to a lesser extent, in Italy) vis-à-
vis previously very high levels (Garibaldi and Mauro 2002).   6
What then has been the role of the OECD jobs strategy in promoting these 
changes? Could the European labor market performance have been even better if this 
strategy had been followed more closely? The preeminence of recommendations related 
to labor market institutions that have characterized the OECD employment strategy has 
drawn much of the analytical attention on the evolution of labor market performance on 
changes in labor market policies. On the other hand, it is clear that European labor 
market performance has been hampered by generally sluggish output growth in recent 
years. The surge in growth that was expected to show up after the inception of the single 
European market has not materialized. More broadly, the emphasis on labor market 
institutions reflects, in our opinion, a neglect of factors such as the extent of product 
market competition, the efficiency of housing and financial markets, and the industrial 
composition of output and employment. In the following two sections we provide a very 
concise assessment of the literature existing on both sets of factors. 
 
3.  LABOR MARKET POLICIES AND OUTCOMES: THE STATE OF THE 
ART 
 
We now consider how some of the factors most often mentioned in the literature as 
contributing to poor labor market performance in Europe (generous social-safety nets, 
high taxes, strong unions, and restrictive employment legislation) have evolved in recent 
years. We first provide a historical account and then an assessment of these institutional 
changes. 
As a matter of fact, welfare states have undergone a thorough reform in most 
OECD countries. Most countries have reduced the funding of passive labor market 
policies. Also, unemployment benefits have been increasingly linked to the participation 
in training programs and, to a lesser extent, to mechanisms encouraging active job 
search during the period of benefit erogation. Moreover, labor supply has been 
stimulated through fiscal incentives, for instance, through the introduction of in-work 
credits. 
Typically, in the United States the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
program replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children in 1996, thereby 
virtually eliminating lifetime entitlements to cash assistance for employable nonworking   7
adults.
2 Other notable changes in the United States included the Earned Income Tax 
Credit expansion in the early 1990s, a refundable tax credit operating through the federal 
tax system subsidising low-wage workers in low-income families. Following suit, many 
other OECD countries introduced stricter entitlement tests for the unemployment 
benefits and employment-friendly fiscal incentives, in particular in-work credits. These 
credits can be linked either to the number of hours worked or to the amount of labor 
income gained (the latter is especially used if data on working hours are not reliable). 
The expenditure on active labor market policies (ALMPs) is considerably greater 
in Europe than in the United States. In Europe, this expenditure actually increased since 
the early 1990s, reaching 1% of GDP, on average (it was around 0.8% previously). In 
the United States, on the other hand, expenditure has been constant at much lower levels 
(0.2% of GDP). In the field of ALMPs, there is also a qualitative difference between 
Europe and United States. In Europe, ALMPs are more geared to the rise of 
employment, while in the United States their main aim is to improve the wage of treated 
workers (Kluve and Schmidt 2002). 
A key point of the reforms of welfare states relates to the tax system. Following 
the tax reforms in the UK and the United States
3 around the 1980s, a number of OECD 
countries introduced tax cuts in the corporate income tax and in the marginal rates for 
high-wage individuals. Particularly incisive reforms of corporate taxes have been 
adopted in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, and Germany. Until the mid-1980s, the 
highest personal income marginal rate was frequently above 65% in the OECD, while 
currently it is around 50% (Owens 2005) for most countries and, in any case, not above 
59% even in countries with a strong welfare-state tradition (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
and the Netherlands). These reductions have also been enacted in very recent years. 
Indeed, marginal tax rates for high-wage income individuals were reduced by 2.9 
percentage points in the EU15 and by more than 5 percentage points in Belgium, France, 
Greece, the Netherlands, and the United States between 2000 and 2003 (Sweden was the 
only country where these rates were slightly increased). Similarly, in the OECD area, the 
average corporate tax rate has dropped by almost 7 percentage points between 1997 and 
2003 (OECD 2004b). 
                                                            
2 Already before 1996 many welfare reforms (time limitations, work requirements, etc.) that ultimately 
became part of the federal law had already been introduced by a number of individual U.S. states. 
3 In the United States, the highest personal income marginal rate was lowered to 50% (from 70%) during 
the 1980 Reagan administration through the Economic and Recovery Tax Act, then to 28% in 1988 
through the Tax Reform Act. It went back to 31% in 1991 and to 39.6% in 1993—the Omnibus Budget   8
Another institutional element that is often brought to the fore when discussing 
European labor market performance is the extent of employment protection. During the 
last two decades, employment-protection legislation has been extensively modified in 
most European countries. This was not so much true within regular employment as in 
the field of temporary employment and fixed-term contracts [a telling depiction of these 
developments is provided in OECD (2004a: ch. 2)]. As a consequence, reforms in 
employment flexibility mostly consisted in favoring the development of nonstandard 
forms of employment. A strong rising trend between 1985 and 2000 in the share of 
nonstandard employment was observed for some European countries, such as France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. However, OECD countries still differ 
considerably in their share of nonstandard jobs over total employment, and many 
countries show no clear trend. 
Finally, strong unions and minimum-wage laws are often mentioned in order to 
explain poor labor market performance in Europe. Yet, powerful trade unions could not 
be conducive to unfavorable labor market performance if unions and firms can 
coordinate centrally over wage setting.
4 Across most of Europe, union power (as 
measured by union density) is weakening, but bargaining coordination is still quite high. 
The adoption of income policies in some countries (for example, Italy, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands) has contributed to increasing coordination in recent years. Bargaining 
coordination remains low in the UK (where, however, union density is not very high). In 
France and Spain the wage-bargaining setup may be among the least favorable in 
Europe, coupling high union coverage with only moderate coordination (Cadiou and 
Guichard 1999). There are some noteworthy cross-country patterns also as far as 
minimum-wage laws are concerned (Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jimeno 2000). 
Scandinavian countries and Austria rely on collective-bargaining agreements covering 
most of the workforce to enforce minimum wages, while most other countries rely on 
statutory provisions.  
Let us now turn to the literature assessing the impact of these institutional 
changes. We certainly do not aim to provide an exhaustive survey of a very vast 
literature, but rather to highlight the gist of the main empirical studies within the field. 
As individual U.S. states experimented with welfare-to-work programs 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Reconciliation Act. In 2003 it was lowered again to 35%. In the UK, the highest rate was lowered in 1979 
from 98 to 75%. In 1988 it was reduced again (to 40%) and has not been changed since then. 
4 Coordination is distinct from centralization, which strictly identifies the most dominant level at which 
wages are negotiated—plant, firm, industry, or economy. Nationwide wage agreements are usually 
coordinated, but highly coordinated bargaining need not be centralized.   9
throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s, many of these policy measures were evaluated 
through randomized assessments. The resulting evidence points to the effectiveness of 
welfare-to-work programs in reducing welfare costs and increasing labor supply [most 
of the evidence is summed up in Bloom and Michalopolous (2001)]. Arguably the most 
interesting state-specific study is the study of the Minnesota Family Investment Program 
(MFIP), which is carefully analysed in Miller et al. (2000). MFIP was implemented in 
1994 and provided both strong negative (participation in mandatory job search 
programs) and positive (strong earnings disregard) work incentives. The results from the 
assessment procedure show that both the “stick” of mandatory work requirements and 
the “carrot” of greater earnings disregards are effective and that their joint application 
brings about significantly positive interaction effects on work and income. 
There is evidence that also in Europe, labor market performance has improved 
following either the shortening of the unemployment-benefit entitlement period or the 
enforcement of a stricter entitlement test. The experience of welfare-to-work programs 
in northern European countries, assessed in de Koning et al. (2004), is particularly 
relevant in this respect. In Nordic countries (as opposed to the UK), the role of ALMPs 
has been particularly strong (Fischer and Matthiessen 2005). As a matter of fact, Kluve 
and Schmidt (2002) report that in Europe, training and job-search policies are, on 
average, more effective than employment subsidies in improving the job prospects of the 
unemployed. In the United States, ALMPs have a tendancy to be less effective, also 
having modest effects on wages. By and large, policies favoring young first-job seekers 
are less effective than those designed for adult males. There is also considerable doubt 
about the long-run effects of job-creation schemes. 
The impact of in-work tax credits is analyzed by Owens (2005), who maintans 
that their effects are stronger if these credits are given to individuals (like in Belgium, 
Finland, France, and the Netherlands) and not to households. Indeed there is some 
evidence that some workers drop out of the labor force when spouses benefit from tax 
credits. Even so, the impact upon employment of these tax credits is positive both in the 
United States and the UK (where they are mostly given to households), possibily 
because of their interaction with other institutional and structural changes. 
Several recent studies [including Prescott (2004)] argue that higher European 
income and payroll tax rates help explain why hours of work are significantly lower in 
Europe. However, the bulk of the empirical labor supply literature suggests that tax rates 
can explain only a small part of this difference (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2005)   10
mostly concerning female labor supply. In Europe, an influential study by Daveri and 
Tabellini (2000) found that virtually all the rise in European equilibrium unemployment 
rates was to be ascribed to increasing payroll taxes. However, according to Layard and 
Nickell (1999), a reasonable estimate would imply that a 5% reduction in the tax wedge 
(including income, consumption, and payroll taxes) lowers the unemployment rate from 
8% to 7%. A key point about these estimates relates to the level at which wage 
bargaining takes place. Taxes on labor seem to matter less in countries where bargaining 
is either highly decentralized (as in the United States and the UK) or highly centralized 
and coordinated (as in the Scandinavian countries and Austria). In the latter, higher taxes 
are (partially) absorbed by a decline in gross wages. In continental European countries, 
however, where bargaining is carried out at the industry level, the tax wedge is likely to 
have a larger influence on labor costs and employment. 
Empirical support for the impact of strict labor market regulations on aggregate 
labor market performance appears to be weak. Since employment protection legislation 
reduces both job destruction and job creation, the relation between protection and 
unemployment is theoretically ambiguous. The existing evidence (OECD 2002 and 
2004a) suggests that stricter employment protection does not raise aggregate 
unemployment, while increasing the duration of unemployment and reducing worker 
turnover. Particularly interesting findings are obtained using state data for the United 
States. Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) show that a state’s adoption of wrongful-discharge 
doctrines significantly slows the job-to-job flows of unemployed relative to employed 
workers. Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006), after a careful consideration of the 
literature and of the instrumental variables that should be adopted in such a policy 
evaluation exercise, conclude that at least one of the common-law exceptions to 
employment at will (the implied-contract doctrine of not terminating a contract without 
good cause) has a modest but robustly negative impact on the employment-to-population 
ratio in state labor markets. There is also some evidence that employment protection 
legislation lowers cross-country employment rates for youth and women, while 
increasing them for prime-age men (OECD 1999; Bertola et al. 2002). These 
relationships, however, fade away when allowance is made for various control 
variables.
5 Similar results are found for temporary jobs, whose development equally 
favors both job creation and job destruction (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002). There is 
                                                            
5 Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) also suggest that wrongful-discharge doctrines discourage skilled 
labor demand in the long run, as high-skill workers have more bargaining power. This could counter the 
bias against relatively unskilled young and female workers.   11
also no consistent evidence of an association between aggregate employment rates and 
the incidence of part-time work (Garibaldi and Mauro 2002). 
It has already been observed that strong trade unions could not be detrimental to 
the economy if unions and firms can coordinate centrally over wage setting. Consistent 
with these expecations, there is evidence that wages are more responsive to variations in 
aggregate labor market conditions if wage agreements are highly coordinated (OECD 
1997: ch. 3; Layard and Nickell 1999: 3053, 3067; Belot and Van Ours 2004). On the 
other hand, if wage agreements are less coordinated or centralized, firm or industry 
wages are more responsive to specific shocks (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991: ch. 
4, table 4; OECD 1997: ch. 3, table 3.B.1). Summing up the weight of the empirical 
evidence on these matters is not easy. Aidt and Tzannatos (2003: ch. 5) conclude that, on 
the whole, coordinated bargaining provides better macroeconomic outcomes than 
decentralized bargaining. This is consistent with the results from wage equations 
estimated over recent samples, according to which real-wage flexibility is highest in 
continental Europe (Cadiou, Guichard, and Maurel 1999; Peeters and Den Reijer 2003). 
These results even suggest that a significant increase in the degree of real-wage 
flexibility took place in countries (for instance, Italy and the Netherlands) where the use 
of income policies contributed to increasing bargaining coordination. 
The available evidence (Card and Krueger 1995; Dolado, Felgueroso, and 
Jimeno 2000) also suggests that in most OECD countries, statutory minimum wages are 
too low to have any impact on unemployment, at least for adult males. Only in countries 
where minimum wages for young workers are not adjusted downwards (for instance, 
France and Spain) or in countries where payroll taxes are very high (for instance, France 
and Italy), is there some evidence that minimum wages adversely affect youth 
unemployment. 
 
4.  INDUSTRIAL COMPOSITION, FINANCE, AND HOUSING 
 
We believe that in order to fully account for diverging labor market trends, structural 
and institutional differences between the United States and Europe should also be 
evaluated outside the labor market. There are three sets of factors that have been 
repeatedly mentioned at this juncture: the role of industrial structure (closely related to 
the extent of product market regulation), financial markets, and the housing sector. 
   12
A. Industrial Composition 
Different industries have varying growth rates of production and demand, as well as 
different labor intensities. Institutional arrangements, regulations, and policies are bound 
to affect them and their employment paths differently. As a result, variation in the 
industrial composition of national economies will lead to a variety of labor market 
outcomes. 
Job prospects in industries that are more open to international competition, such 
as manufacturing, are lowered by import penetration and by foreign outsourcing of 
domestic firms. In contrast, competitive, export-oriented sectors and industries with high 
national self-reliance have better employment prospects. Services generally are less open 
to international competition and this has strongly contributed to their faster employment 
growth (Wood 1994). Moreover, growth opportunities are higher in countries where 
new, fast-growing sectors in both manufacturing and services are more important 
(Vivarelli and Pianta 1998). 
The first major distinction to be drawn is between manufacturing and services. In 
spite of the heterogeneity of the activities performed in this sector, services have 
consistently been the mainspring of job creation in recent years. In the United States, 
employment increased by 47% from 1975 to 2003—about 9% in industry and more than 
63% in services. In Europe, employment increased by 21% over the same period, with 
jobs falling by almost 21% in industry and increasing by 60% in services. The much 
larger weight of services in the U.S. economy is at the root of its better employment 
performance. In 1971, services accounted for about 69% of total U.S. employment, and 
between 41% and 59% in European countries (based on own elaborations from AMECO 
and STAN data). 
The above data also highlight the importance of industrial composition within 
manufacturing. As documented in OECD (1996) and Vivarelli and Pianta (1998), 
throughout the 1980s and the 1990s the United States had close to half of its 
manufacturing value-added in industries that experienced employment growth at OECD 
level. On the contrary, European economies included many more declining sectors. Of 
course, stagnant employment in Europe could be the result of faster productivity growth, 
which might improve competitiveness and raise living standards. Yet, GDP growth in 
Europe has been slower than in the United States and Japan. Hence, job losses due to 
productivity gains do not seem to have been compensated by job gains linked to higher 
competitiveness. Countries with a large share of employment in fast-growing sectors are   13
better positioned to capture this compensation effect. In Europe the “virtuous circle” 
between innovation, growth, and employment that characterized the 1950s and 1960s 
(Pini 1995) largely disappeared after the mid-1970s, and innovation began to be 
associated with labor saving technical change.  
Naturally, the key question is what has stopped the reallocation of labor from 
declining to growing industries in EU countries? The view of Blanchard (1997) and 
Caballero and Hammour (1998) is that difficulties in sectoral labor reallocation stemmed 
from the rise in capital per worker through which EU firms attempted to restore their 
profitability after the wage shocks of the 1970s. Other authors stress the economic 
relevance of factors having the nature of public goods (education, social infrastructure, 
and so forth) that might not be supplied adequately through the market. There is 
evidence by D’Acunto, Destefanis, and Musella (2004) that export-led growth 
(consistent with virtuous circle between innovation and growth) might be at work in the 
Italian regions closer to the European core, but not in the Mezzogiorno region of 
southern Italy. According to Paci, Pigliaru, and Pugno (2000), out-migration from 
agriculture is a powerful mainspring of productivity growth. They find that a number of 
southern European agricultural regions have experienced less out-migration than 
expected, and that out-migration from agriculture is faster in regions where the decline 
of manufacturing is slower. All this seems to indicate that the pace of structural change 
is decisively slowed down by a less dynamic manufacturing sector. 
Although these arguments may carry some weight, they do not address the 
structural differences between Europe and the United States in the relative growth of the 
service sector. In this regard, it is interesting to consider the arguments by Hopenhayn 
and Rogerson (1993), Bertola (1994), and Saint-Paul (2002). According to them, strict 
employment protection laws either slow down labor reallocation from declining to 
expanding sectors or they encourage specialization in the production of declining-sector 
goods. Yet, as pointed out by Layard and Nickell (1999: 3063), these arguments apply 
only to the closure of old plants and the opening of new ones since, by just relying on 
quits, continuing firms can reduce employment by up to 10% per annum. 
An arguably more promising route is put forward by Messina (2006). Economy-
wide regulations, such as screening procedures and tax-related requirements for start-ups 
and sectoral regulations such as zoning laws or restrictions on shop-opening hours, 
constitute barriers to entry for entrepreneurs. Recent studies focus on the effects of 
different aspects of product market regulations on labor market outcomes. The   14
stringency of entry regulations appears to be negatively associated with employment 
rates (Nicoletti et al. 2001) and entrepreneurial activity (Fonseca, Lopez-García, and 
Pissarides 2001) across OECD countries. At the sectoral level, Bertrand and Kramarz 
(2002) find that entry regulation hinders job creation in the French retail sector.  
In the presence of economy-wide entry regulations, the market price of services 
and rents in the economy increases, triggering a reduction in labor supply. This provides 
a rationale for the negative association between product market regulations and the 
employment rate found in the literature, and is also consistent with the gap in the 
marketization of service activities between the United States and European economies 
found by Freeman and Schettkat (2001b). Accordingly, European households respond to 
tighter entry regulations by substituting away from the purchase of services in the 
market (childcare, home repairs, and leisure activities) and towards home production, 
while Americans, facing lower service prices, supply more hours of work purchasing 
equivalent services in the market. The simulations in Messina (2006) show that 
economy-wide regulatory barriers to entry obstruct the natural pattern of structural 
change, hindering the development of those sectors whose demand is income elastic. 
Thus, countries with tighter restrictions on entry are expected to have a relatively 
underdeveloped service sector. This negative relationship persists even after controlling 
for a wide range of factors, which might also shape cross-country differences in 
industrial structure. 
 
B. Financial Markets 
What about the role of financial liberalization in generating low interest rates and the 
credit boom? Actually, investment has not been especially low in Europe. Gross fixed 
capital formation in Europe was about 24% of GDP in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Investment rates have since declined and gross fixed capital formation has averaged 
about 19% of GDP in recent years. However, at the end of the 1990s, European 
investment levels were still above those in the United States [around 17% of GDP; see 
Hurst (1998)]. 
Obviously, credit markets differ in many ways between the United States and 
Europe. Acemoglu (2001), mostly relying on Rajan and Zingales (1998), reports that 
stock market activity, venture-capital finance, and the funding of small businesses by 
large banks appear more important in the United States than in Europe. According to 
Acemoglu, technological change can have a persistently adverse effect on   15
unemployment in Europe because, in the presence of less efficient credit markets, 
entrepreneurs who require financial capital to start new businesses cannot easily borrow 
the necessary funds. Acemoglu then classifies manufacturing industries into high, 
medium, and low credit-dependent categories, following Rajan and Zingales (1998), and 
examines whether the most credit-dependent industries, such as electronics and office 
and computer equipment, have grown more slowly in Europe since 1970. No evidence is 
found for major cross-sector growth differentials. However, employment in the most 
credit-dependent industries is higher in the United States, suggesting that differences in 
credit markets may be playing some role in constraining employment creation in Europe. 
Similar evidence is reported in Wasmer and Weil (2004), who provide a simple model 
combining labor market and credit market imperfections, showing that the latter tend to 
increase unemployment, and in Fonseca and Utrero (2004), who find a role for 
interactions between labor market and credit market imperfections in constraining firm 
size across OECD countries. 
 
C. The Housing Market 
Barriers to geographical mobility are clearly an obstacle to the efficient functioning of 
the labor market. Layard and Nickell (1999: table 13) provide convincing prima facie 
evidence that geographical mobility is lowest in southern Europe and highest in the 
United States and the Scandinavian countries. In the literature on geographical mobility, 
the role of housing availability and affordability has been recently emphasised as a 
determinant of long-distance movements. The different user costs of housing between 
two areas affect the permanent income prospects that a household faces in its decision to 
move. Rationing and, more generally, rigidities in the housing market also discourage 
mobility. Furthermore, the propensity to move may be lower for homeowners, who have 
to liquidate their housing assets in a given locality to buy a new house elsewhere, thus 
facing sizeable transaction costs. 
Hughes and McCormick (1985) examine the implications of UK housing policy 
for internal migration. Bover, Muellbauer, and Murphy (1989) emphasize the 
importance of regional house-price differentials for labor mobility in the UK. In 
addition, Jackman and Savouri (1992) provide evidence for an impact of relative house 
prices on UK interregional migration. Focusing on regional migration in Spain, Antolin 
and Bover (1997) examine house-price differentials as an explanation of mobility 
choices, apart from demographic characteristics, unemployment status, and wages.   16
Finally, Cannari, Nucci, and Sestito (2000) argue that the cost of housing is likely to 
represent an important disincentive to move and, to a considerable extent, accounts for 
the puzzling evidence of falling mobility levels in Italy. 
Homeowners are relatively immobile, presumably because they find it much 
more costly than private renters to move in search of new jobs. Evidence from the 
British Social Attitudes Surveys reveals the greater (expressed) willingness to move of 
renters compared to homeowners (Oswald 1997). Using the UK Working Lives Survey, 
Owen and Green (1997) find that moves to and from the small British private rental 
sector account for almost as many residential moves as the whole of the owner-occupied 
sector. Perusal of the UK 1995 General Household Survey confirms that the length of 
time at one’s current address is markedly lower if one is a renter. 
If owning a house reduces geographical mobility, the consequences for the labor 
market of secularly rising homeownership could be profound. Could the rise in 
homeownership be part of the high European unemployment story? A decline in the 
willingness to switch locations can be expected to raise the aggregate unemployment 
rate. People living in rented public-sector housing are less likely to move across regions 
or leave unemployment (Hughes and McCormick 1985 and 1987). Intuition suggests 
that the same might be true of homeowners and Wadsworth (1995) finds that private 
renters have a notably faster outflow rate from unemployment into jobs.  
Levels of homeownership and unemployment rates are correlated at a 
surprisingly high level across countries and throughout time. Moreover, countries with 
the fastest growth in homeownership had the most rapid growth in unemployment 
(Oswald 1997). Most industrialized countries have recently experienced substantial 
growth in homeownership. Two exceptions are Switzerland and the United States. These 
two countries also have had almost no long-run change in their unemployment rates. 
Moreover, Greece and Spain currently have the highest rates of owner-occupied housing 
in the OECD; they also have very high unemployment rates. This relationship appears to 
hold in quite different circumstances and for many places. Oswald (1997) reports 
evidence favorable to this hypothesis for a panel of OECD countries and for the U.S. 
states, as well as slightly weaker evidence for regions of the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
West Germany. Supportive evidence is also reported by Belot and Van Ours (2004), 
who carry out an empirical analysis for a panel of OECD countries. 
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5.  A SET-UP FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Since the OECD’s Job Study (1994), labor market rigidities are held to play a key role in 
the relatively bad European labor market performance. Recent OECD follow-up reports 
(Elsmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta 1998; OECD 1999; Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval 
2005) reiterate this view. They also provide evidence, mostly based on bivariate 
relationships between some policy reform indicators and unemployment/employment 
rates, suggesting a direct link between structural reform and labor market outcomes. 
The most recent OECD follow-up report (Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval 2005) 
considers an index of the intensity of reform policy measuring the magnitude and 
comprehensiveness of the labor market reforms, broadly linked to the OECD’s jobs 
strategy, which were undertaken between 1994 and 1999.
6 Their concern is to detect the 
extent to which these reforms had an effect on employment and unemployment rates 
during subsequent years. Believing that some time is needed before the benefits of 
reform materialize, Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval (2005) introduce a five-year time lag 
between the implementation of policy reforms and the measurement of their labor 
market consequences. In accordance with previous follow-up reports, they find 
empirical support for the hypothesis that OECD-inspired policy reforms improve labor 
market performance. In particular, they report significant Spearman correlation 
coefficients among the reform policy index and the rates of employment and 
unemployment (respectively of 0.48 and -0.50). Such unequivocal empirical support 
rarely stems leading academic papers. 
Empirical evidence on the labor market rigidity view mostly comes from 
multivariate analyses that have become increasingly complex since the pioneering work 
of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991). While these studies tend to conclude that 
institutions (welfare safety nets, unions, taxation, and employment protection) are a key 
part of the story, their results are less robust and uniform than is commonly believed. 
According to Glyn et al. (2003), the literature turns up little evidence for performance-
worsening effects of union density and mixed evidence for unemployment insurance and 
employment protection legislation. At the same time, performance-enhancing effects of 
collective-bargaining coordination and (to a smaller extent) active labor market policies 
tend to emerge. An important part of the explanatory power of labor market institutions 
derives in fact from these two institutions’ ability to enhance performance. 
                                                            
6 For details about its calculation, see annexes 2 and 3 in Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval (2005).   18
In this paper we evaluate the OECD view through a different approach. Instead 
of relying on complex multivariate models, where possible misspecifications are hard to 
detect, we assess the robustness of the claims made in Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval 
(2005) within a very similar cross-country set-up and suggest some ways in which the 
impact of unobserved heterogeneity and outliers on policy estimates can be detected and 
modeled in this simple cross-country framework. 
We consider 21 long-standing member countries of the OECD (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the UK, and the United States) over recent years (1994–2004, although some of our 
variables stretch back to 1988). We thus exclude from our sample countries with less 
than one million inhabitants and countries that either acceded to OECD in fairly recent 
years or that still have a GDP per capita far below the OECD mean. Our sample differs 
from Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval’s, but we believe that our choice—dictated to some 
extent by data reasons—makes for more reliable results. We also show below some 
evidence according to which our main points are not likely to be affected by this sample 
selection.  
We measure labor market performance through (cycle-adjusted) changes in the 
rates of employment and unemployment, and we relate these changes to a set of 
indicators for labor market institutions, mostly from the OECD. We begin from bivariate 
relationships between policy change indicators and labor market performance, show in a 
simple way that they cannot allow for the effects of unobserved heterogeneity and 
outliers, and proceed to reassess the role of labor market institutions. 
The basic regression format, closely following the set-up in Brandt, Burniaux, 
and Duval (2005) is: 
 
( r_2004i - r_1994i ) = f ( Policy changesi  )       (1) 
 
The dependent variable stands for changes in either the employment or the 
unemployment rate for country i between 1994 and 2004.
7 Following Brandt, Burniaux, 
and Duval, labor market performance reacts to policy changes with a 4–5 year lag. Our 
                                                            
7 We adopt a linear specification, hence changes are absolute differences in employment or unemployment 
rates and levels are not logged. As will be made clear below, this specification yields more readily 
interpretable results than its loglinear counterpart. Non-nested testing of the two specifications suggests 
that their goodness of fit is virtually equal.   19
policy change indicators include, first and foremost, the index of the intensity of reform 
policy computed by Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval (2005) for the 1994–99 period. We 
also consider separately the components of this index, that is, indicators relating to 
changes in the following policy fields: taxes and social security contributions; 
employment protection legislation; unemployment benefit system; active labor market 
policies; retirement and pension schemes; wage formation; and part-time and working-
time flexibility. Given that policy changes may take some time to work their effects out, 
we add to the above the ten-year changes (1989–99) in the indexes of employment 
protection legislation and wage bargaining coordination calculated by the OECD. We 
also consider both five- and ten-year changes (1988–93 and 1988–98, respectively) in 
the OECD indexes of product market regulation and ten-year changes (1991–2001) in 
homeownership rates calculated from various sources (clearly the latter is not stricto 
sensu a policy change indicator, but it is convenient for exposition purposes to range it 
in this category).
8 
Results from equation (1) will be commented on in the following section, but it 
may be appropriate to point out here that the prima facie evidence is, like in Brandt, 
Burniaux, and Duval (2005), favorable to the OECD view. Consider the scatter plots in 
figures 1 and 2. They suggest that the basic result obtained in the OECD follow-up 
report is not affected by our sample choice. The Spearman correlation coefficients 
between the composite policy change indicator and rates of employment and 
unemployment is 0.61 and -0.53, respectively. 
 
 
                                                            
8 More details about all these indicators are provided in the appendix.    20







































There are various misgivings, however, that can aired about this kind of 
evidence. Perhaps the most obvious one, in the light of the modern econometric 
literature about policy evaluation, is that policy changes are not randomly distributed 
across countries. When the labor market performance is bad, governments may be more   21
willing to implement OECD-recommended labor market policies, just as suggested in 
Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval (2005: 58), that succeed in raising employment growth. On 
the other hand, for example, in response to bad labor market performance governments 
may enact other types of policies not contemplated in Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval 
(2005), such as income policies or wage agreements. Thus, the positive correlation 
between the 1994–99 intensity of policy reforms and improvements in labor market 
performance may be spurious, arising from their correlations with policy initiatives that 
have little to do with the OECD strategy or with other unobserved phenomena. We also 
find, indeed, strong negative correlation (Spearman ρ’s equal to -0.69 and -0.72, 
respectively) between employment- and unemployment-rate changes and their initial-
year’s levels. In order to control for all these factors, we include in the estimates the 
1994 (initial-year) rates, a strategy similar to the inclusion of past history variables in 
microeconometric policy evaluation analysis. 
 
( r_2004i - r_1994i ) = f ( Policy changesi ,  r_1994i  )      (2) 
 
A further point is that the cross-sectional set-up implies that we share with 
Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval the hypothesis that policy changes affect all countries with 
equal strength. However, we do not have to also share the hypothesis that all countries 
are hit by the same vector of shocks. The discussion in section 6 should, in fact, alert us 
to the possibility that changes in industrial structure, not wholly amenable themselves to 
policy changes, could have an impact of their own on labor market performance. In 
order to allow for this possibility, we rely on the following specification: 
 
( r_2004i - r_1994i ) = f ( Policy changesi ,  r_1994i ,  Shocksi )      (3) 
 
 
The Shocksi in equation (3) will be proxied in empirical work by changes in the share of 
construction or service employees over total employment. 
Finally, it clearly emerges from figures 1 and 2 that our sample may contain 
some outlying countries (Ireland, Spain, and, for unemployment, Finland), exerting an 
anomalous influence on the estimation results. In order to provide evidence on this, we 
rely on Cook’s distance (C) and DfBeta (DfB), which are both statistics for assessing the 
influence of a given observation. Observations with larger C values than the rest of the 
data are those which have a relatively greater influence on the coefficient estimates. If 
DfB is greater than zero, the observation increases the slope; if it is smaller than zero, it 
decreases the slope.    22
Once it is decided that there is an outlier problem, we can proceed in various 
ways. If there are only one or two clearly outlying countries, we could simply exclude 
them from the estimates. Otherwise we can rely on robust regression techniques. Here 
we adopt median regression (styled as qreg by Stata 9.2, our estimation package) and 
another type of robust technique (rreg), which relies on a weighting scheme giving 
outliers less weight. One difference between qreg and rreg is that they attempt to 
estimate different versions of the central tendency: qreg estimates the median, while 
rreg comes closer (in principle) to estimating a robust mean. The difference may be 
negligible in essentially symmetrical distributions, but for skewed distributions where 
the mean and median are not expected to be equal, one would expect their estimates to 
deviate systematically. When dealing with skewed distributions where the median is 
noticeably different from the mean, rreg may be more appropriate than qreg. 
 
6.  SOME RECENT EVIDENCE 
 
We now bring to the data the empirical set-up described in the previous section. We 
begin by discussing the results from equation (1), a bivariate relationship between policy 
change indicators and labor market performance akin to the exercise carried out in the 
OECD follow-up reports. We then proceed to equations (2) and (3), considering the 
impact upon the policy coefficients of past labor market performance and structural 
shocks. As far as the latter are concerned, we only report estimates including the 
changes in the share of construction employees over total employment. The share of 
service employees is virtually never significant. In order to understand the evidence 
correctly, it is important to notice that all policy indicators are computed in such a way 
as to affect positively changes in employment rates and negatively changes in 
unemployment rates. 
The first batch of results is presented in tables A.1 and A.2. There are a few 
items that characterize these results and that, to a large extent, remain true also in 
subsequent analysis. First of all, the impact of policy change indicators is very 
heterogeneous. 
More specifically, reforms in taxes, as well as in employment protection 
legislation, are somehow significant in equation (1), but largely lose significance in the 
other equations (epl even acquires a “wrong” sign in the unemployment equation). Part-
time and working-time flexibility reforms have a consistently wrong sign, with varying   23
degrees of significance. Retirement and wage formation reforms are basically never 
significant, as are active labor market policies in the employment equation. The latter, 
however, becomes significant for unemployment in equations (2) and (3). 
Unemployment benefit reforms are always significant and rightly signed for 
unemployment, and also have some impact on employment. The Brandt-Burniaux-Duval 
composite indicator is significant in equation (1) for both employment and 
unemployment, but heavily loses significance in equations (2) and (3). The other 
variables are generally not significant. 
The second main result is that past labor market performance matters. The 
lagged-level variable is always significant and its inclusion affects policy coefficients, 
generally decreasing their significance. Similarly, the changes in the share of 
construction employees are very significant, although their influence on the policy 
coefficients is arguably weaker.  
At any rate, the estimates in tables A.1 and A.2 are likely to be influenced by 
anomalous observations, whose existence is apparent from figures 1 and 2. We provide 
eevidence on this matter through two different diagnostics: Cook’s distance (C) and the 
DfBeta (DfB) of the policy change indicator. C measures the effect of deleting a given 
observation; observations with larger C’s than the rest of the data have correspondingly 
higher leverage. Fox (1991: 34) suggests values of C greater than 4/(n - k - 1) as a cut-
off criterion, where n is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. 
For us, this cut-off is equal to 4/18 ≈ 0.22. Other authors suggest however C > 1 as the 
strong indication of an outlier problem. Similarly, an observation may be considered an 
influential outlier if |DfB| > 2. An alternative rule of thumb suggests a critical |DfB|> 
2/(n
0.5) – equal to 2/(21
0.5) ≈ 0.44 for us. Recall that if DfB > 0, the observation increases 
the slope; if <0, the observation decreases the slope. In table A.3 we only provide C’s 
above 0.22, while in table A.4 we show the couplets of highest and lowest DfBs, 
underlining the values above the 0.44 threshold. 
In line with our expectations, Ireland and Spain very often show up as influential 
observations. Switzerland (for employment), Greece, and Portugal (for unemployment) 
also are very frequent outliers (Finland is not apparently a very serious problem country, 
but this is not the key issue here). The bottom line is, however, that the outlier problem 
is by no means limited to these countries and cannot subsequently be solved by singling 
them out. We then proceed to estimate equations (1)–(3) though robust regression   24
methods, rreg and qreg. We present in tables A.5 and A.6 the results obtained with these 
procedures.  
First of all, qreg estimates are always less significant. This is to be expected, as 
median regression is relatively inefficient and our sample is pretty small. When 
comparing the two techniques, we thus concentrate on coefficient sizes. Given that the 
lagged labor market performance variable is always significant, we confine our 
comments to equations (2) and (3). Tax, retirement, and wage formation reforms are 
never significant, while reforms concerning employment protection legislation, as well 
as part-time and working-time flexibility, appear sometimes significantly, but with the 
wrong sign. Unemployment benefit reforms and, especially, active labor market policies 
are slightly more significant and tend to show up in regressions with very close 
coefficient values. Finally, the Brandt-Burniaux-Duval composite indicator is significant 
for employment, but not for unemployment. Given the previous evidence on the single 
indicators, it could, however, be asked how much this result does not crucially depend 
upon the role of active labor market policies. In table 4, below, we show some estimates 
relating to this matter. 
It turns out that an indicator created by aggregating unemployment benefit 
reforms with active labor market policies is virtually just as significant as Brandt-
Burniaux-Duval composite indicator and always more significant than Brandt-Burniaux-
Duval composite indicator minus active labor market policies. Hence, our finding at 
least partially reiterates the point made in Glyn et al. (2003), according to which much of 
the explanatory power of labor market institutions for labor market performance derives 
in fact from the performance-enhancing effects of active labor market policies. A final 
remark is that all these indicators are much more significant for employment than for 
unemployment.  
Table 4. Summing Up the Evidence 
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 Summing things up, the gist of our evidence is that in recent OECD cross-country 
data, changes in labor market performance are consistently (and inversely) linked to its 
lagged level. Structural changes are also important: changes in the share of construction 
employees are very significant, even in the presence of various kinds of policy change 
indicators. As far as the latter are concerned, some consistent role seems to emerge only for 
unemployment benefit reform and, even more so, active labor market policies. 
 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the first part of this paper, we considered in detail some factors often mentioned in the 
literature as contributing to poor labor market performance in Europe. The evidence here is 
that coordinated bargaining helps achieve a better labor market performance, even in 
conjunction with strong unions. Empirical evidence also reveals that there are strong 
interactions between labor market performance and welfare reforms. Properly designed 
welfare-to-work policies have been able to deliver more jobs without large wage penalties, 
both in Nordic countries and in the United States. On the other hand, empirical support for 
the influence of strict labor market regulations on unemployment appears to be weak. 
Similarly, the development of nonstandard jobs does not appear to have had a significant 
impact on aggregate labor market performance. 
The evaluation of structural changes in the United States and European labor markets 
is not wholly accurate without examining the role of other factors, such as industrial 
structure, financial markets, and the housing sector. We find that industrial composition 
matters for labor market performance and that it is likely to respond favorably to reduced 
product market regulation. An independent impact of financial structure on labor market 
performance has not yet been convincingly demonstrated, but interactions seem to exist 
between financial market and labor market imperfections. The structure of the housing 
market has, on the other hand, a seemingly strong impact on the geographical mobility of 
labor. 
In the second part of the paper, we turned to the evidence provided by the OECD 
follow-up reports, mostly in Brandt, Burniaux, and Duval (2005), and evaluate their results 
in a very simple cross-country set-up. We suggested that the impact of unobserved 
heterogeneity can be modeled through the lagged level of the employment (or 
unemployment) rate, as well as through some structural shocks, and carefully assessed the 
existence of outliers, also providing two kinds of robust estimates. We are obviously aware   27
that this exercise is still subject to many strictures, perhaps foremost of which is the 
hypothesis of equal coefficients across countries. We believe, however, that our analysis 
could contribute to a better assessment of the OECD view by examining it in a framework 
akin to that of the typical OECD follow-up report and free from the complexities of full-
fledged multivariate modeling. 
Our main results are that in recent OECD cross-country data, changes in labor market 
performance are consistently (and inversely) linked to its lagged level. Structural changes are 
also important; changes in the share of construction employees are very significant, even in 
the presence of various kind of policy change indicators. As far as the latter are concerned, 
some consistent role seems to emerge only for unemployment benefit reforms and, even 
more so, active labor market policies. There are two additional points that should be noticed. 
The first is that the policy change indicators, if they matter at all, seem to do so for the 
employment, as distinct from the unemployment, rate. This is interesting because it points to 
some important differences in the determination of these two indicators of labor market 
performance, at least partially contradicting the oft-heard argument that, in recent years, 
countries with high unemployment rates also tended to have low labor force participation 
rates (Saint-Paul 2004). The other point is that some countries, especially Ireland and Spain, 
seem to possess some distinctive factors setting them apart from the rest of the sample. This 
matters not only inasmuch as the impact of influential country observations on the overall 
results should be carefully taken into account, but also because undue generalizations from 
particular country experiences should be taken with a lot of caution. 
Summing up, our evidence first shows how sensitive the OECD follow-up evidence 
is to changes in its basic (arguably too simple) set-up. It also shows that the most 
comprehensive available measures of institutions and policies can only account for a minor 
part of the differences in labor market performance across OECD countries over the past ten 
years. Such evidence lends support to Atkinson’s (2001: 48–9) view that “aggregate cross-
country evidence, interesting though it may be, cannot on its own provide a reliable guide to 
the likely consequences of rolling back the welfare state.” 
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APPENDIX 
 
Legend of the Tables 
 
∆er = changes in the rate of employment, 1994–2004 
∆ur = changes in the rate of unemployment, 1994–2004 
er94 = rate of employment, 1994 
ur94 = rate of unemployment, 1994 
∆csh9500 = changes in the share of construction employees over total employment, 1995–2000 
tax = index of reforms in taxes and social security contributions, 1994–99 
epl = index of reforms in employment protection legislation, 1994–99 
ub = index of reforms in the unemployment benefit system, 1994–99 
almp = active labor market policies, 1994–99 
retir = index of reforms in retirement and pension schemes, 1994–99 
wage = index of reforms in wage formation, 1994–99 
flex = index of reforms in part-time and working-time flexibility, 1994–99 
bbd = composite index of the intensity of reform policy, 1994–99 
epl8999 = changes in the OECD index of employment protection legislation  
crd8999 = changes in the OECD index of wage bargaining coordination, 1989–99 
dereg9398 = changes in the OECD index of product market regulation, 1993–98 
dereg8898 = changes in the OECD index of product market regulation, 1988–98 
mob9101 = changes in the homeownership rates, 1991–2001 
 
Note: The absolute values of t-ratios are given in brackets.   35
Table A.1. OLS - Dep. var.: ∆er 
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Table A.2. OLS - Dep. var.: ∆ur 
 





































































































































































       
   37
Table A.3.a. Cook’s Distance - Dep. var.: ∆er 
 
 tax  epl  ub  almp retir wage flex bbd epl8999 crd8999 dereg9398 dereg8898 mob9101
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Table A.3.b. DfBeta’s - Dep. var.: ∆er 
 
 tax  epl ub  almp retir wage flex bbd epl8999 crd8999 dereg9398 dereg8898 mob9101
     





















































































































                         





















































































































                         





















































































































   39
Table A.4.a. Cook’s Distance - Dep. var.: ∆ur 
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Table A.4.b. DfBeta’s - Dep. var.: ∆ur 
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Table A.5.a. Rreg - Dep. var.: ∆er 
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 Table A.5.b.  Qreg - Dep. var.: ∆er 
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Table A.6.a. Rreg - Dep. var.: ∆ur 
 





































































































































































        
   44
Table A.6.b. Qreg - Dep. var.: ∆ur 
 





































































































































































      
 